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ABSTRACT. In this essay, Doret J. de Ruyter defends the claim that parents as well as professional educa-
tors need to impart ideals to children in order to realize their wish that children become happy and flour-
ishing adults. The argument consists of two parts. First, de Ruyter shows how ideals are important to
construing the meaning of objective goods. Second, she contends that educating children with ideals is
important to motivating them to strive for something higher or better. De Ruyter’s analysis rests on two
key concepts: ‘‘ideals,’’ which refer to things one believes to be superb, excellent, or perfect, but that are
as yet unrealized, and ‘‘happy flourishing,’’ which describes the fulfillment of objectively identifiable
generic goods and the person’s satisfactory meaningful interpretation of these goods.
INTRODUCTION
In many Western countries adults complain that young people are apathetic
when it comes to their involvement in greater moral issues. They are said to be fo-
cused only on themselves or their inner circle and primarily interested in material
acquisitions. I do not know if this is true in every respect. Of course, many young
people wish to have things their parents could not dream of having themselves,
but there are also many who do show interest in charitable work and who partici-
pate in discussions to resolve the societal problems that face or are caused by their
peers. Some observers also argue that parents as well as professional educators
have become uncertain as to which values and ideals they may impart to children.
The fall of the grand narratives has resulted in a fragmentation of value systems in
Western societies. This ‘‘value gap,’’ as Roy Baumeister and Mark Muraven have
called the loss of the dominant value system, has led to new and more immediate
quests for meaning in life.1 The seemingly dominant way in which people find
meaning and identity is through consumer products. George Ritzer argues, for
instance, that one reason for the success of a chain like McDonald’s is the fact that
it is predictable. This may be an advantage: ‘‘in a rapidly changing, unfamiliar, and
seemingly hostile world, the comparatively stable, familiar, and safe environment
of a McDonaldized system offers comfort.’’2 If this is true for parents and pro-
fessional educators, it should not surprise adults that children and young people
follow this lead.
My aim in this article is not to discuss the veracity of claims such as these,
but to put forward the claim that parents as well as professional educators need to
impart ideals to children. My main argument is that raising children with ideals is
consistent with — in fact, necessary for — the goal of educators to help children
1. Roy F. Baumeister and Mark Muraven, ‘‘Identity as Adaptation to Social, Cultural, and Historical
Context,’’ Journal of Adolescence 19, no. 5 (1996): 405–416.
2. George Ritzer, The McDonaldization of Society (Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press, 2000),
16.
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become happy and flourishing adults. Before I embark on the task of developing
this link, I will elucidate my conceptions of ‘‘ideals,’’ ‘‘happiness,’’ and ‘‘flourish-
ing.’’ I conclude with a concise description of the primary responsibilities of
parents and teachers with regard to transmitting ideals to children.
IDEALS
The concept ‘‘ideals’’ refers to situations or characteristics of a person that a
person believes to be superb, excellent, or perfect, and that have not as yet been
realized, at least not in the life of the person who holds the ideal. From this
description we can distill four necessary conditions of ‘‘ideals’’: (1) they refer to
ideas that a person believes to be excellent or perfect, (2) the person must attach
high value to these ideas, (3) they are (still) part of the person’s dream or imagina-
tion, and (4) they are not easily achievable and may even be impossible to achieve,
for they refer to states of the highest quality.3 All four aspects must apply for some-
thing to be appropriately called an ‘‘ideal.’’ Persons can value many things very
highly, but these can be quite ordinary or common and, even in the person’s own
view, not representative of excellence. Equally, persons cherish things that are
already present in their lives and are thus related to accomplished realities instead
of ideals. Finally, a person can agree with someone else about something represent-
ing excellence without personally attaching high value to that ‘‘excellent’’ charac-
teristic or situation. In such a case, the person does not share the ideal.
The first characteristic of ideals — that is, that they refer to excellence or per-
fection — seems necessarily to lead to the conclusion that ideals are unrealizable.
For instance, Nicholas Rescher contends that an ideal refers to ‘‘a perfect, com-
plete, definitive instance of its type — a very model or paradigm that answers to
the purposes at issue in a way that is flawless and incapable of being improved
upon.’’4 In our imperfect world, unqualified perfections — both in terms of perfect
situations and in terms of ideal characteristics of persons, such as being generous,
just, courageous, or conscientious — are impossible to realize completely. This
does not exclude the possibility that persons can show these traits of character on
many occasions, but to do so all the time seems beyond our human capacities. And
when certain people have been able to develop one of these aspects to a degree of
perfection, we call them saints, heroes, or exceptional.5 Another reason commonly
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3. This conception suggests that ideals do not have an objective status, that is, they only exist if a person
claims to have them. However, this does not exclude the possibility of having a rational discussion about
ideals, for instance, debating whether or not the ideals of a person do indeed refer to excellence. Thus,
ideals are not subjective in the sense that they are based on taste or mere preference.
4. Nicholas Rescher, Ethical Idealism: An Inquiry into the Nature and Function of Ideals (Berkeley and
London: University of California Press, 1987), 117.
5. John Kekes, The Art of Life (Ithaca, New York, and London: Cornell University Press, 2001). The
difference between achievable excellent situations and unachievable excellent traits of character is pos-
sibly the reason Kekes uses the term ‘‘ideal’’ only for the latter ones and refers to the former as ‘‘personal
projects.’’
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given for the unrealizability of ideals is that they are too vague or multifaceted and
therefore always leave open aspects that are not realized — that is, new aspects
will be discovered the moment others have become reality. As a result, the ideal in
all its aspects will never be completely attainable.6 Wibren Van der Burg argues, for
instance, that the ideal of democracy has dimensions of which we will only be
aware once (parts of) the ideal as we now perceive it have been achieved.7 We may
think that we will be able to realize the ideal, but the moment we believe that we
have done so, other or new aspects that must be realized in order to establish an
ideal democracy will come to light.
While it is true that perfection cannot be realized, in common usage it is not
considered incorrect to apply the term ‘‘ideal’’ to states that are realizable. If some-
one says that her ideal is to become the best violin player in the world, to break
Martina Navratilova’s record in tennis matches won, or to have earned sufficient
money to take a year’s holiday and tour the world, no one would say to her that
she should not use the term ‘‘ideal’’ for these goals because it is reserved for unre-
alizable visions. Rescher acknowledges this use of the term and posits a distinction
between full-scale ideals, which are unrealizable, and mini-ideals, which refer to
something that is ‘‘as perfect as we can realistically expect to find.’’8 I agree with
Rescher that there is a distinction to be made between ideals that are, in principle,
unrealizable and those that can be achieved, but I prefer to use the terms ultimate
ideals versus common ideals. Common ideals refer to those unrealized values a
person believes to be excellent and that he or she highly appreciates. These ideals
can be realized because they are not flawless in their very nature but, rather, the
best a person can imagine achieving in his or her lifetime (in the short or long
term). I call these ‘‘common’’ because in common parlance it is appropriate to
apply the term ideals to states that are excellent but not perfect, whereas in philos-
ophy ‘‘ideals’’ tend to be used to refer to perfections only. Additionally, common
ideals refer to things on a common scale that can be realized by the average person.
Finally, these ideals are of a concrete nature and thus one is able to establish
whether or not one has realized the ideal. This does not mean that common ideals
are less important to a person. However, while one person or even many people
may consider them to be excellent, these ideals cannot be perfect. Furthermore,
people must excel in order to achieve and maintain these ideal situations or char-
acteristics, but they do not have to achieve perfection.
HAPPINESS OR FLOURISHING?
In both philosophy and psychology, there are two traditions with regard to the
conceptualization of happiness, well-being, or flourishing: objective theories,
which are called eudaimonic theories within psychology, and subjective theories,
6. Dorothy Emmet, The Role of the Unrealizable: A Study in Regulative Ideals (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1994). See also Rescher, Ethical Idealism, 117.
7. Wibren Van der Burg, De verbeelding aan het werk. Pleidooi voor een realistisch idealisme [Imagi-
nation at work: A plea for realistic idealism] (Kampen: Agora, 2001).
8. Rescher, Ethical Idealism, 116.
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which psychologists know by the name of hedonistic theories or research into sub-
jective well-being.9 Here I will give a concise description of these traditions, but I
will not delve deeply into all the particular conceptions that have been developed
on human happiness or flourishing. The analytic distinction is, in my view, suffi-
cient to address the question posed by this article. Additionally, although there is a
distinction to be made between conceptions of the meaning of ‘‘flourishing’’ and
‘‘happiness,’’ on the one hand, and the ways in which people can achieve such
states, on the other, these two issues are also intertwined.10 Finally, both terms can
be used to describe the quality of a person’s life over a period of time or to evaluate
a person’s life overall as well as for particular periods in which we believe the per-
son is flourishing or happy. In this article I will mainly focus on describing the
quality of life in the first sense. The main difference between the overall and time-
slice evaluation seems to lie in the aspects that are taken into consideration.
Whereas the time-slice approach primarily takes into account the positive emo-
tions, either in terms of a joyous state or in terms of a feeling of satisfaction with
oneself or one’s accomplishments, the overall approach also, or only, takes into
consideration aspects such as the quality of the accomplishments and the domains
in which these are achieved.
Objective theories argue that we can objectively identify characteristics of
human flourishing independent from a person’s (emotional) endorsement of what
this entails. On this view, whether or not a person likes the goods, wants them, or
values them is irrelevant to the judgment that the goods are conducive to a per-
son’s flourishing.11 The goods are intrinsically good. Items on the objective lists are
related to characteristics of human beings or to their biological characteristics, for
instance health and physical pursuits, friendship/social relations, safety, intel-
lectual development, creative development, and freedom.12 Within psychology, the
Self-Determination Theory (SDT) developed by Richard Ryan and Edward Deci is
currently one of the most influential theories within the eudaimonic tradition.
The central concept in the eudaimonic tradition is self-realization, self-fulfillment,
or self-actualization,13 and the SDT aims to clarify what it means to actualize or
9. See, for example, David G. Myers, The Pursuit of Happiness: Discovering the Pathway to Fulfillment,
Well-Being, and Enduring Personal Joy (1992; repr. New York: Quill, 2002); and David Lykken, The
Nature of Happiness (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).
10. For instance, in contrast to the dominant debate about the plausibility of the two traditions, which
concentrates on the difference in their conceptions of ‘‘happiness’’ or ‘‘flourishing,’’ Richard Kraut main-
tains that it is not so much themeaning of happiness that underlies the difference between the traditions
but their view on how happiness is achieved. Richard Kraut, ‘‘Two Conceptions of Happiness,’’ The Phil-
osophical Review 88, no. 2 (1979): 167–197.
11. See, for example, Richard J. Arneson, ‘‘Human Flourishing versus Desire Satisfaction,’’ in Human
Flourishing, eds. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1999).
12. See, for example, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hack-
ett, 1985); Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); and the
humanist psychologist Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 2d ed. (New York: Harper and
Row, 1970).
13. Alan S. Waterman, ‘‘Two Conceptions of Happiness: Contrasts of Personal Expressiveness (Eudaimo-
nia) and Hedonic Enjoyment,’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 64, no. 4 (1993): 678–691.
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realize the self and how that can be accomplished.14 Ryan and Deci argue that there
are three innate psychological needs or nutriments that are functionally essential
to a person’s flourishing: (1) the need for autonomy or self-determination, (2) the
need for competence or effectiveness, and (3) the need for relatedness or affiliation.
According to a subjective interpretation of human well-being, humans thrive if
and only if they themselves feel or know that they do — that is, humans are happy
if they believe they are, and only when they believe they are happy do they experi-
ence well-being. This can be interpreted as a hedonistic view of human happiness,
or, in other words, as having a particular state of mind (being exhilarated or deeply
satisfied, for instance) irrespective of what one has these positive feelings about.15
One subjective theory in which human well-being does not have these hedonistic
connotations is the informed desire theory. There are two key characteristics of
this theory. The first is that people will flourish if they fulfill the desires that bene-
fit their well-being. Which desires do so is not obvious and, therefore, in contrast to
the actual desire theory, the informed desire theory argues that people’s flourishing
is enhanced if they reflect on the desire and rank their desires in order of prefer-
ence. The second characteristic is that the desires include longings that are not
related to an appetitive state or whose fulfillment does not give psychological
satisfaction.16 For instance, the desire of parents to look after their chronically ill
child and give up their prospects for a career or a flourishing social life may con-
tribute to their well-being, although it does not make them particularly overjoyed.
I propose, and have defended elsewhere, a theory of human well-being that
combines the two traditions.17 A combined theory has both objective and person-
related aspects. It is objective in that it claims that human flourishing requires
particular goods and characteristics, among which are the goods of health, social
relations, and safety, as well as intellectual, creative, and physical pursuits — all
goods that we can objectively establish to be essential to human flourishing. How-
ever, the idea that well-being can exist independent of the perspective of an agent,
that it does not require the acknowledgment of a person that he or she flourishes,
does not conform to my linguistic or psychological intuition. I do not believe that
we use the concept of well-being accurately if a person does not share that evalua-
tion. Therefore, we also need subjective aspects, and I suggest that there are two of
these, both of which are related to the claim that there are goods that are good for
all human beings but not necessarily good for all in the same way. As Richard
Kraut observes, for instance, objectivists
14. Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci, ‘‘On Happiness and Human Potentials: A Review of Research
on Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-Being,’’ Annual Review of Psychology 52 (2001): 146.
15. This was defended by Epicurus, for instance, and somewhat more recently by Henry Sidgwick, al-
though Robert Adams questions whether or not Sidgwick fully agrees with his own theory. See Robert
M. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
16. James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986).
17. Doret J. de Ruyter, ‘‘Pottering in the Garden: On Human Flourishing and Education,’’ British Journal
of Educational Studies 52, no. 4 (2004): 377–389.
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might believe that for each of us there is a large class of ideal lives, and that to be happy we
have to come reasonably close to one of those lives. And an objectivist can also say that differ-
ent types of individuals have different capacities, so that what is ideal for one person may not
be ideal for another.18
This brings us to the agent-relative aspects of flourishing or happiness. The
objectively identifiable goods are so general that they are in themselves not suffi-
cient to help a person lead a flourishing life. The person has to construct his or her
own interpretation of the goods, which is one that he or she values and finds
worthwhile and that, when fulfilled, will be satisfactory to him or her. To take an
example, while Sister Anne flourishes by having a spiritual relationship with God,
her parents thrived by having a long-term commitment to each other, and her
sister prospers by not having an exclusive relationship at all. Thus, although there
are objectively identifiable goods, human flourishing is personal and diverse because
there are many ways in which people can interpret and combine the diverse
generic goods.19 Although this first aspect is agent-related, it can be brought under
the objective theory as well, as Kraut indicates, and therefore does not as yet make
the proposal a combined theory of well-being. The second agent-related aspect
does. In addition to the personal interpretation of the objective goods, a person
needs to be satisfied with this interpretation as well as with the actions or the life
path to which this interpretation leads him or her.
To conclude, I believe that human well-being consists of two aspects: the ful-
fillment of generic goods that are objectively identifiable and the meaningful inter-
pretation of these goods by the individual in a way that is personally satisfactory.
For this conception I will use the term happy flourishing. Admittedly, this is an
ugly combination, but it best expresses what I have in mind. I should note that this
proposal is not in any way unique or even original. James Griffin also claims that
his theory is both objective and subjective, and he proposes abandoning the dis-
tinction altogether. John Kekes also recommends a combination of objective and
subjective aspects, suggesting that the standards are ontologically subjective but
epistemologically objective.20 And, finally, my proposal is similar to those put forth
by the philosopher Douglas Rasmussen and the sociologist of happiness Ruut
Veenhoven.21
WHY RAISING CHILDREN WITH IDEALS HELPS THEM BECOME HAPPY FLOURISHING ADULTS
My premise is that parents wish the best for their children. In my view this
means that parents ought to hope that their children will lead lives in which they
are able to give a meaningful interpretation to objective goods, aspire to achieve
them, and that the interpretation and ways of pursuing are satisfactory to them.
In this sense I agree with Raymond Belliotti, who argues that
18. Richard Kraut, ‘‘Two Conceptions of Happiness,’’ The Philosophical Review 88, no. 2 (1979): 181.
19. See also Griffin,Well-Being, 54, 55.
20. John Kekes, ‘‘Happiness,’’Mind 91, no. 363 (1982): 358–372.
21. See, for example, Douglas B. Rasmussen, ‘‘Human Flourishing and the Appeal to Human Nature,’’ in
Human Flourishing, eds. Paul et al; and Ruut Veenhoven, ‘‘The Four Qualities of Life: Ordering Concepts
and Measures of the Good Life,’’ Journal of Happiness Studies 1, no. 1 (2000): 1–39.
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Happiness remains valuable, but it is not the most important human aspiration. We should
teach our children how to lead robustly meaningful, valuable lives. If they do, they will deserve
worthwhile happiness and often realize it. But even if they are not predominantly happy, they
will have fought the good fight, fashioned in a worthwhile biography, and added value to the
world.22
The best that parents can do for their children, therefore, is to offer them their
own best interpretation of the objective goods, because parents do not know what
kind of people their children will develop into and what will make them happy
flourishing adults. The argument for my claim consists of two parts: I will first
show why ideals are important to construing the meaning of objective goods. Sec-
ond, I will establish that ideals motivate people to strive for something higher or
better.
THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING REGULATIVE IDEALS
The generic goods are general and open to many conceptions; given this,
people must develop their own concrete interpretation of these goods in order to
flourish and be happy. For this, they need guideposts or values. An approach to
this issue that I have come to find sympathetic is Joseph Raz’s theory of values.
Raz has developed a social dependence thesis, which consists of two elements:
The special social dependence thesis claims that some values exist only if there are (or were)
social practices sustaining them. The (general) social dependence thesis claims that, with some
exceptions, all values depend on social practices either by being subject to the special thesis or
through their dependence on values that are subject to the special thesis.23
The social dependence thesis leads to value pluralism, but not to relativism: the
ground for saying that an action or object is good is relative to a particular genre,
but this verdict is unrestricted, that is, it is absolute. I can say that a restaurant is
good because it has three stars in the Michelin Guide, which ensures excellent
service and exquisite food, or that a restaurant is good because it is inexpensive, it
serves decent meals, and the service is quick. Both are good absolutely but in dif-
ferent ways. This allows us to say without contradiction that works of art or social
arrangements that are completely different are equally good.
But why would ideals be important in this context? The reason for this is that
there are diverse ways in which one can give meaning to the goods. To use Raz’s
terms, the goods have different genres that can all be good. These genres have differ-
ent standards, but they are similar in the fact that they all have levels. If one has a
clear idea about what is best within a genre — what would count as excellence —
one is able to evaluate current practices or alternative practices against these su-
preme standards. Ideas or images of, for instance, the trustworthy friend, the reliable
colleague, the harmonious family, or the just society function as regulative ideals,
and they may assist people in evaluating what actions or behaviors they should
undertake, or what they should change in order to achieve these ideal standards.24
22. Raymond A. Belliotti, Happiness Is Overrated (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004),
96–97.
23. Joseph Raz, The Practice of Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 19.
24. Emmet, The Role of the Unrealizable.
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Which genre will be good for children is something they have to discover them-
selves, but what makes their actions within this genre good is something that edu-
cators can teach them. As JohnWhite recently argued,
Children’s education in this area should induct them into the goods themselves; but it should
also lead them into a reflective appreciation of the nature of these goods, their provenance,
historical development and variety. Only in this way can they, too, become members of the
class of reliable judges about the nature of personal well-being and its values.25
Finally, even though it is impossible to bring all the diverse goods to perfec-
tion, educators should introduce children to ideal images within the diverse genres
of the goods because they do not know which ideals or genres will contribute to
their happy flourishing as adults.26 If educators were to select ideals for the chil-
dren, or if they were to impose the ways in which children balance their pursuit of
ideals, they would be more likely to hamper than to facilitate children’s develop-
ment into happily flourishing adults.
But how, one may ask, can the pursuit of ideals be conducive to happy flour-
ishing if many or maybe most of them can never be realized? Is it even rational to
pursue the unrealizable? It is obvious that the answer is different for common
ideals, which may be realizable, and ultimate ideals, which are not realizable.
Since the unrealizability of ultimate ideals poses a challenge to the rationality of
pursuing them, I will discuss these ideals only.
According to Rescher, it is not necessary to see a goal as something that is
attainable; the fact that a goal may not be attainable does not imply that one cannot
pursue it.27 Moreover, it is not irrational to make an attempt; it would only be irra-
tional if one were to believe that it was possible to achieve it. He offers a couple
of arguments to support his claim that pursuing ideals is rational, even when the
person knows that the ideal can never be realized. The first is that by pursuing
the ideal, the actor will achieve aims that can only be realized through pursuing
the impossible. The second is a psychological one: by aiming high, one will achieve
more than by pursuing a realizable goal. In other words, the more one attempts to
achieve, the better one will actually perform.
With regard to the first argument, it is important to investigate the reason a
person gives for pursuing the unattainable ideal, for I think that Rescher may not
be right in every case. We can use the distinction between intrinsic and instrumen-
tal goods, on the one hand, and internal and external goods, on the other, to argue
where he is and is not correct. If the person pursues an ideal such as peace on earth
in order to gain esteem or to create a social environment in which he or she feels
at home, and if these latter aims are the primary reasons for pursuing the ideal, we
could say that the ideal the person claims to have is not his or her genuine ideal,
25. John White, ‘‘Educating for Success,’’ in Idealen, Idolen en Iconen van de Pedagogiek [Ideals, idols
and icons in education], eds. Doret J. de Ruyter, Gerdien D. Bertram-Troost, and Stijn M.A. Sieckelinck
(Amsterdam: SWP, 2005), 268.
26. This does not mean that these ideals refer to excellent situations or personal characteristics that are
ego-focused. Living in an ideal society, for instance, is also important for happy flourishing.
27. Rescher, Ethical Idealism, 6–16.
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but, rather, the person is actually pursuing fame or personal well-being. In such a
case, the acclaimed ideal is instrumental with respect to the person’s intrinsic
goods.28 However, in distinguishing between internal and external goods, it is pos-
sible to argue that the actor does in fact pursue the ideal because he or she values
what the ideal refers to (internal goods), but in doing so also achieves other aims
(external goods) as byproducts.29 In this case, we can correctly say that the person is
pursuing his or her ideals. Achieving external goods while pursuing an ideal does
not turn the ideal into an instrumental value because these external goods are
attained only when the person pursues the ideal for its intrinsic value.
Rescher’s second argument is more convincing. It seems plausible that people
who strive for the best will perform better than people who aim for the average,
although, as Barry Schwartz et al. have observed, there is no empirical research
that supports this point: ‘‘Presumably, not being satisfied with ‘good enough’ spurs
one on to achievements that less ambitious people will not attain, though there is
as yet no evidence on this point.’’30 But even they suggest that there are advantages
to adopting a maximizing strategy, precisely because of the intuitive plausibility of
the idea that striving for more will take one further. This brings me to the second
part of my argument.
IDEALS MOTIVATE US TO AIM FOR THE BEST
Ideals motivate people to strive for something higher or better than they might
otherwise attempt.31 Ideals can stimulate people to strive for a better life, a better
society.32 This seems to be a worthy educational aim, but is it?
Maximizers can be described as people who strive for the best in all situations.
They want to choose the best option, to fulfill their desire in the most optimal
way, or to develop themselves in the best possible way. Satisficers, on the other
hand, settle for good enough. It seems quite clear that the pursuit of ideals requires
maximizing strategies or behaviors. In making choices that affect one’s ability to
achieve the ideal, the pursuer will choose the best available option.33
28. Of course, it is also possible that a person explicitly pursues an ideal such as being rich or famous and
perceives these ideals as instrumental only.
29. For the argument that happiness or flourishing are themselves byproducts, see, for example, Jon
Elster, ‘‘States that Are Essentially By-products,’’ Social Science Information 20, no. 3 (1981): 431–473;
Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Happiness (London: Rider, 1992); and Viktor
E. Frankl,Man’s Search for Meaning (1946; repr. New York: Washington Square Press, 1985).
30. Barry Schwartz, Andrew Ward, Sonja Lyubomirsky, John Monterosso, Katherine White, and Darrin
R. Lehman, ‘‘Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice,’’ Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 83, no. 5 (2002): 1194.
31. See also Rescher, Ethical Idealism.
32. See, for example, Russell Jacoby, Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian Age (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
33. It may seem as if such people are not maximizers overall, because they may settle for something
good enough in situations that do not bear upon their ideals. It is, however, arguable that they choose to
do so, because they realize that if they were to opt for a maximizing strategy in these circumstances, they
would not have the time and energy to pursue their ideals. Such decisions are, of course, to be interpreted
as a maximizing strategy overall.
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Michael Slote questions the desirability of this approach, instead arguing in
favor of a conception of individual moderation, which he perceives to be ‘‘an
admirable tendency, a form of virtue.’’34 Moderate individuals do not deny them-
selves all pleasures or the satisfaction of all desires, but they have definite (though
subjective) limits to which they will go. On this reasoning, people may aspire or
ask for less than they can get out of the belief that this ultimately serves their best
interests. In such cases, people are seeking what is best for them personally by tak-
ing the path of moderation, but they do not aspire to moderation. Slote has no
quarrel with this, but argues that there can also be situations in which one opts for
less than is possible without such justifications. He offers two reasons as to why
satisficing moderation is praiseworthy or, rather, why a maximizing approach is
problematic. First, the optimizer needs to discover all available options and weigh
these against each other, which, according to Slote, ‘‘has an unspontaneous and
constrained aspect, and we to some extent feel sorry for, think less well of someone
lacking in spontaneity and constrained in his behaviour.’’35 Second, such a person
appears needy and lacking in self-sufficiency because of ‘‘his tendency to eke out
the most or best he can in every situation.’’36
Could not Slote’s conception be an accurate characterization of the maximizer?
Is not a person who aspires to be as virtuous as possible a maximizer? This may
seem counterintuitive, but if so, this would be caused by the fact that the notion
of the maximizer has been primarily developed in the domain of economics.
Although Slote does widen this interpretation, his discussion remains too exclu-
sively centered on prudential strategies (that is, those in which a person aims to
fulfill his or her own desires in the utmost way) whereas it should incorporate a
person’s moral characteristics as well.
Conceptualizing a maximizer as someone who tries to develop him- or herself
in the best possible way seems difficult to reject or criticize, at least when ‘‘best’’
includes one’s moral dispositions. What educator would not aim for such an opti-
mal development, particularly when it concerns the moral dispositions of a per-
son? At least one philosopher has written a well-known objection to this, of
course, Susan Wolf. She argues that ‘‘moral perfection in the sense of moral saintli-
ness, does not constitute a model of personal well-being toward which it would be
particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive.’’37 Some of
her main arguments are that moral saints are too good for their own well-being,
that such people are so focused on moral issues that other important nonmoral
capacities cannot be developed, and that such people may be dim-witted or bland.38
She also argues that to be so passionate about morality that one sacrifices
34. Michael Slote, ‘‘On Seeking Less Than the Best,’’ in Philosophical Issues in Moral Education and
Development, eds. Ben Spiecker and Roger Straughan (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988), 65.
35. Ibid., 71.
36. Ibid., 72
37. Susan Wolf, ‘‘Moral Saints,’’ Journal of Philosophy 79, no. 8 (1982): 419.
38. Ibid., 421, 422.
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everything else for it (one’s other talents, for instance) seems misguided: ‘‘The way
in which morality, unlike other possible goals, is apt to dominate is particularly
disturbing, for it seems to require either the lack or the denial of the existence of
an identifiable, personal self.’’39 Wolf’s proposal, which she calls the point of view
of individual perfection, implies that ‘‘the moral worth of an individual’s relation
to his world will [likewise] have some, but limited, value — for, as I have argued,
the (perfectionist) goodness of an individual’s life does not vary proportionally with
the degree to which it exemplifies moral goodness.’’40 She does not deny the
importance of morality but questions whether becoming a moral saint is a worthy
ideal, because we value people’s nonmoral characteristics as well and, in the case
of moral saints, these are necessarily seen as inferior.
I agree with Wolf that the world would not be an interesting place if, for in-
stance, intellectual or aesthetic values were not able to flourish due to the overrid-
ing importance attached to moral values. Therefore, educating children to become
maximizers should involve maximizing all their capacities. Since this will include
the moral ones as well, the world will definitely be a better place. In this case, the
maximization does not focus on the individual aspects or separate characteristics
of a person, but on the overall balance of them.41 Of course, this was implied pre-
viously by my suggestion that happy flourishing requires that one pursue the ideal
in several objective goods. This does not mean that all aspects or characteristics
should be developed to an equal level; the balance must depend upon a person’s
capacities and will therefore be different for everyone. It does imply, however, that
aspects cannot be neglected. Even though children with particular talents (in
music, science, or sports, for example) must spend a lot of time and energy in
developing related capacities and dispositions, other values (such as friendship) and
dispositions (such as intellectual curiosity or friendliness) should not be neglected.
SOME FINALWORDS ON THE ROLE OF PARENTS AND TEACHERS
I have already alluded to the roles of parents and teachers at several points in
this article, but I think it is important to bring these together in a description
of the main responsibilities of parents and teachers with regard to helping their
children/students develop into adults who pursue ideals.
One might expect that parents already offer ideals of the goods that are condu-
cive to the flourishing of their children and also pursue these ideals themselves.
We may presuppose that parents normally do so, but this should not be too readily
assumed, for even in cases of less ideal interpretations of the good, many parents
may find it difficult to be a good example for their children. For instance, pursuing
a healthy life style would imply that adults give up smoking when they have chil-
dren, that they eat healthy food and give the same to their children, that they
39. Ibid., 424.
40. Ibid., 437.
41. See also Rescher, Ethical Idealism.
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exercise and take their children along, and so forth. But, as we know, this is not
always the case.
Even more important is that parents assist children to become practically wise
adults who are able to formulate and pursue their ideal of the goods and are able to
balance their ideals. Being wise assumes more than being intelligent or knowledge-
able. A ‘‘practically wise’’ person can ‘‘deliberate finely about what is good and
beneficial for himself, not about some restricted area — e.g. about what promotes
health or strength — but what promotes living well in general.’’42 A practically
wise person is not only a knowledgeable person, but also someone who is attached
to what she understands to be good, right, or true, and has the will to act upon her
insights. Again, with regard to the good of health, a practically wise person will be
a modest or frugal person. He will think about his diet carefully — not only with
regard to his own health, but also in relation to ecological and socioeconomic
issues (how food is produced, by whom it is produced). This responsibility may be
even more challenging for a lot of parents than imparting their ideals, but it is
something they have to aspire to do if they take their wish for the future of their
children seriously.
Finally, parents ought to give children the freedom to explore which ideal con-
ceptions of the goods will allow them to become happy flourishing adults, which
implies increasing the freedom and autonomy they afford their children. If parents
aim to ensure that their children adopt the way of life or conception of the good
that contributes to the parents’ happy flourishing, they not only hinder their child-
ren’s development into practically wise adults (by forcing them to act on the
parents’ insights, rather than their own), but they also diminish the likelihood that
their children will flourish and be happy, because they push them to live a life that
has been good for others (the parents) but that is not necessarily good for them.
However, it may be too much to ask that parents be able to offer alternative ideals
to their children, which brings me to the responsibility of teachers.
A preliminary question with regard to teachers’ responsibility is whether or
not they are allowed to offer ideals to pupils in the first place, since ideals are part
of a conception of the good life and there is considerable debate over whether
teachers, particularly those who work in public schools and are thus representa-
tives of the state, are allowed to educate children within or into a particular con-
ception of the good life. Although no one believes in the possibility of neutral
education, acknowledging this is very different from advocating that teachers
should induct students into a particular conception of the good life. I want to
defend the position that teachers should offer such instruction, even if their con-
ception of the good life differs from the one the students’ parents would impart.
In this essay I cannot develop a full political-philosophical account with regard to
parental rights and the degree of freedom granted to teachers, but I do not believe
that it is necessary to develop such an analysis. There are two reasons for claiming
that teachers have this responsibility, both of which bear on the interests of
42. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1140a 25–30.
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children and, in most countries, on their legal rights as laid down in the Interna-
tional Convention on Children’s Rights.43 First, since states cannot be certain that
all children are raised with ideals, and since ideals in education are necessary for
children to be able to flourish, they need to offer them to children, for states have a
responsibility to provide education that serves the interests of children. This is par-
ticularly important in deprived areas where it is not uncommon for parents to have
lost all faith in the possibility to achieve excellence in life.44 Second, states cannot
be certain that all children are raised with the ideals that are good for them. Since
states have no good reason to intervene in families when parents are falling short
in offering ideals that are good for their children (as intervention in families is only
justified in liberal democracies when parents do not fulfill their minimal duties),
the states must work through the public schools. Teachers, therefore, have a re-
sponsibility to present to their students many diverse ideals, that is, many ideals
within the possible genres of the objective goods. This approach allows students to
explore which of these ideals they wish to pursue themselves. As Harry Brighouse
has, in my view, convincingly argued, schools need to be discontinuous in their
values from both the students’ families as well as mainstream society, because ‘‘all
students have a compelling interest in being able to become an autonomous, self-
governing person.’’45 This, in turn, is conducive to their development into happy
flourishing adults.
If parents and teachers are able to meet the responsibilities described here,
they will be acting in accord with their hope that children will become happy
flourishing adults. Of course, there is no guarantee that these children will become
happy and will flourish — any number of circumstances may prevent them from
doing so. But I think we may go so far as to claim that, with ideals as a key compo-
nent of their educational baggage, children will have a good chance to flourish and
be happy in situations that are not particularly favorable to achieving this.
43. The countries excepted from these legal protections are the United States of America and Somalia.
44. The New York Times bestseller Random Family, by Adrian Nicole LeBlanc (New York: Scribner,
2003), offers a ‘‘good’’ example of this problem.
45. Harry Brighouse, ‘‘Channel One, the Anti-Commercial Principle, and the Discontinuous Ethos,’’
Educational Policy 19, no. 3 (2005): 528–549.
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